In this article, we explore the metaphysics of Hegelian dialectics and its implications for a developmental science. More specifically, we investigate how Hegel initiated the move from classical mechanicism to dialectics, thus rearranging the ruling scientific logic at his time. We do this by introducing some of the metaphysical assertions implied by mechanicism and showing how these assertions are scientifically inadequate in explicating the relation between the empirical matter and abstract representation of a given (developmental) phenomenon. This claim leads us to a discussion of the theory of knowledge offered by Hegel as opposed to Kant, and how these theories relate to the struggle between process and structure. Finally, we find that the subject is displaced in between observation and experience and thus epistemically constrained in its access to empirical matters. This fact draws attention to the importance of considering the metaphysical aspects of the sense-modalities, and how such aspects relate to any given developmental phenomenon. Overall the article illustrates the potentials of Hegelian dialectics for avoiding entrenched dualisms and static oppositions in future research.