Abstract.The paper discusses the flaws in the solutions proposed byphilosophical positions of constructivism and naturalism of the mind–bodyand mind–reality problems to which Cartesian dualism gives rise. It isargued that subscribing—explicitly or implicitly—to the assumptions ofthese philosophical positions by two research traditions within currentacademic psychology, that is, social constructionism and cognitive neuro-science, the flaws and problems that these positions inherit cease to be ofmerely ‘philosophical’ interest, but become flaws in the foundations of thescience of psychology. More importantly, the aim is to show how argu-ments in refutation of the assumptions of naturalism and constructivism inturn suggest and point to tenable alternative assumptions about the relationbetween mind and reality and between mind and body, which—as a matterof principle—must be taken for granted by both philosophy and psychol-ogy.