Affective incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Affective incarnations : Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion. / Roald, Tone; Levin, Kasper; Køppe, Simo.

In: Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 38, No. 4, 01.11.2018, p. 205-218.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Roald, T, Levin, K & Køppe, S 2018, 'Affective incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion', Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 205-218. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000101

APA

Roald, T., Levin, K., & Køppe, S. (2018). Affective incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 38(4), 205-218. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000101

Vancouver

Roald T, Levin K, Køppe S. Affective incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 2018 Nov 1;38(4):205-218. https://doi.org/10.1037/teo0000101

Author

Roald, Tone ; Levin, Kasper ; Køppe, Simo. / Affective incarnations : Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion. In: Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology. 2018 ; Vol. 38, No. 4. pp. 205-218.

Bibtex

@article{7a82d401c045488298f3d176639d3a44,
title = "Affective incarnations: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion",
abstract = "In this article, we outline and discuss Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of affective and emotional life as found in Phenomenology of Perception, including his portrayal of the affective body-subject. By relating his central phenomenological claims to bodily theories of emotion, exemplified primarily by Antonio Damasio's theory, we demonstrate Merleau-Ponty's continued relevance. Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion mirrors the (dis)connection between one's own body and the mechanical body. He shows that affect and emotion cannot be understood fully without taking the experiential, existential, and intersubjective situation into account and thereby challenges traditional bodily theories of emotion by exposing the affective incarnated body-subject as a fundamental capacity to feel and perceive meaning through incarnate, constitutive, and intersubjective relations.",
keywords = "Affect, Damasio, Emotion, Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology",
author = "Tone Roald and Kasper Levin and Simo K{\o}ppe",
year = "2018",
month = nov,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1037/teo0000101",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "205--218",
journal = "Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology",
issn = "1068-8471",
publisher = "American Psychological Association",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Affective incarnations

T2 - Maurice Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion

AU - Roald, Tone

AU - Levin, Kasper

AU - Køppe, Simo

PY - 2018/11/1

Y1 - 2018/11/1

N2 - In this article, we outline and discuss Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of affective and emotional life as found in Phenomenology of Perception, including his portrayal of the affective body-subject. By relating his central phenomenological claims to bodily theories of emotion, exemplified primarily by Antonio Damasio's theory, we demonstrate Merleau-Ponty's continued relevance. Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion mirrors the (dis)connection between one's own body and the mechanical body. He shows that affect and emotion cannot be understood fully without taking the experiential, existential, and intersubjective situation into account and thereby challenges traditional bodily theories of emotion by exposing the affective incarnated body-subject as a fundamental capacity to feel and perceive meaning through incarnate, constitutive, and intersubjective relations.

AB - In this article, we outline and discuss Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of affective and emotional life as found in Phenomenology of Perception, including his portrayal of the affective body-subject. By relating his central phenomenological claims to bodily theories of emotion, exemplified primarily by Antonio Damasio's theory, we demonstrate Merleau-Ponty's continued relevance. Merleau-Ponty's challenge to bodily theories of emotion mirrors the (dis)connection between one's own body and the mechanical body. He shows that affect and emotion cannot be understood fully without taking the experiential, existential, and intersubjective situation into account and thereby challenges traditional bodily theories of emotion by exposing the affective incarnated body-subject as a fundamental capacity to feel and perceive meaning through incarnate, constitutive, and intersubjective relations.

KW - Affect

KW - Damasio

KW - Emotion

KW - Merleau-Ponty

KW - Phenomenology

U2 - 10.1037/teo0000101

DO - 10.1037/teo0000101

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85055630959

VL - 38

SP - 205

EP - 218

JO - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

JF - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

SN - 1068-8471

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 209516595