Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition. / Southgate, Victoria.

In: Psychological Review, Vol. 127, No. 4, 07.2020, p. 505-523.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Southgate, V 2020, 'Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition', Psychological Review, vol. 127, no. 4, pp. 505-523. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000182

APA

Southgate, V. (2020). Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition. Psychological Review, 127(4), 505-523. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000182

Vancouver

Southgate V. Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition. Psychological Review. 2020 Jul;127(4):505-523. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000182

Author

Southgate, Victoria. / Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition. In: Psychological Review. 2020 ; Vol. 127, No. 4. pp. 505-523.

Bibtex

@article{413068f65bf74d38ade1801126e79038,
title = "Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition",
abstract = "From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others' perspectives, and can do so even when the other's perspective conflicts with the infant's perspective. Infants' success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other's perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others' attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants' ability to take others' perspectives. but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others' mental states.",
keywords = "perspective taking, theory of mind, infants, self-representation, altercentrism, ATTRIBUTING FALSE BELIEFS, LEVEL-2 PERSPECTIVE-TAKING, EXECUTIVE FUNCTION, VISUAL-ATTENTION, MENTAL STATES, OTHER DISTINCTION, OBJECT IDENTITY, IMPLICIT THEORY, OXYTOCIN BLURS, MEMORY BIASES",
author = "Victoria Southgate",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1037/rev0000182",
language = "English",
volume = "127",
pages = "505--523",
journal = "Psychological Review",
issn = "0033-295X",
publisher = "American Psychological Association",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Are Infants Altercentric? The Other and the Self in Early Social Cognition

AU - Southgate, Victoria

PY - 2020/7

Y1 - 2020/7

N2 - From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others' perspectives, and can do so even when the other's perspective conflicts with the infant's perspective. Infants' success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other's perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others' attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants' ability to take others' perspectives. but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others' mental states.

AB - From early in life, human infants appear capable of taking others' perspectives, and can do so even when the other's perspective conflicts with the infant's perspective. Infants' success in perspective-taking contexts implies that they are managing conflicting perspectives despite a wealth of data suggesting that doing so relies on sufficiently mature Executive Functions, and is a challenge even for adults. In a new theory, I propose that infants can take other's perspectives because they have an altercentric bias. This bias results from a combination of the value that human cognition places on others' attention, and an absence of a competing self-perspective, which would, in older children, create a conflict requiring resolution by Executive Functions. A self-perspective emerges with the development of cognitive self-awareness, sometime in the second year of life, at which point it leads to competition between perspectives. This theory provides a way of explaining infants' ability to take others' perspectives. but raises the possibility that they could do so without representing or understanding the implications of perspective for others' mental states.

KW - perspective taking

KW - theory of mind

KW - infants

KW - self-representation

KW - altercentrism

KW - ATTRIBUTING FALSE BELIEFS

KW - LEVEL-2 PERSPECTIVE-TAKING

KW - EXECUTIVE FUNCTION

KW - VISUAL-ATTENTION

KW - MENTAL STATES

KW - OTHER DISTINCTION

KW - OBJECT IDENTITY

KW - IMPLICIT THEORY

KW - OXYTOCIN BLURS

KW - MEMORY BIASES

U2 - 10.1037/rev0000182

DO - 10.1037/rev0000182

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 31868391

VL - 127

SP - 505

EP - 523

JO - Psychological Review

JF - Psychological Review

SN - 0033-295X

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 254521732